Signed-off-by: NotAShelf <raf@notashelf.dev> Change-Id: If95a5258a393542564f68b3a1ebc7ff66a6a6964
275 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
275 lines
6.9 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"math/rand"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"notashelf.dev/watchdog/internal/aggregate"
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"notashelf.dev/watchdog/internal/config"
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"notashelf.dev/watchdog/internal/normalize"
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"notashelf.dev/watchdog/internal/ratelimit"
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)
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// Handles incoming analytics events
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type IngestionHandler struct {
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cfg config.Config
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pathNorm *normalize.PathNormalizer
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pathRegistry *aggregate.PathRegistry
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refRegistry *normalize.ReferrerRegistry
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metricsAgg *aggregate.MetricsAggregator
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rateLimiter *ratelimit.TokenBucket
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rng *rand.Rand
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}
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// Creates a new ingestion handler
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func NewIngestionHandler(
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cfg config.Config,
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pathNorm *normalize.PathNormalizer,
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pathRegistry *aggregate.PathRegistry,
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refRegistry *normalize.ReferrerRegistry,
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metricsAgg *aggregate.MetricsAggregator,
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) *IngestionHandler {
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var limiter *ratelimit.TokenBucket
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if cfg.Limits.MaxEventsPerMinute > 0 {
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limiter = ratelimit.NewTokenBucket(
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cfg.Limits.MaxEventsPerMinute,
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cfg.Limits.MaxEventsPerMinute,
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60_000_000_000, // 1 minute in nanoseconds
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)
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}
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return &IngestionHandler{
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cfg: cfg,
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pathNorm: pathNorm,
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pathRegistry: pathRegistry,
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refRegistry: refRegistry,
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metricsAgg: metricsAgg,
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rateLimiter: limiter,
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rng: rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)),
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}
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}
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func (h *IngestionHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Handle CORS preflight
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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h.handleCORS(w, r)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Apply CORS headers to actual request
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h.handleCORS(w, r)
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// Only accept POST requests
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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// Check rate limit
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if h.rateLimiter != nil && !h.rateLimiter.Allow() {
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http.Error(w, "Rate limit exceeded", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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// Apply sampling (0.0 or 1.0 = no sampling, < 1.0 = sample)
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if h.cfg.Site.Sampling > 0.0 && h.cfg.Site.Sampling < 1.0 {
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if h.rng.Float64() > h.cfg.Site.Sampling {
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// Sampled out, return success but don't track
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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}
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// Check context cancellation
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if r.Context().Err() != nil {
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return
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}
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// Parse event from request body
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event, err := ParseEvent(r.Body)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Validate event
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if err := event.Validate(h.cfg.Site.Domain); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Normalize path and check if path can be added to the registry.
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normalizedPath := h.pathNorm.Normalize(event.Path)
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if !h.pathRegistry.Add(normalizedPath) {
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// Path was rejected due to cardinality limit
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h.metricsAgg.RecordPathOverflow()
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// Still return success to client
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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// Extract visitor identity for unique tracking
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ip := h.extractIP(r)
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userAgent := r.Header.Get("User-Agent")
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// Track unique visitor if salt rotation is enabled
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h.metricsAgg.AddUnique(ip, userAgent)
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// Process based on event type
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if event.Event != "" {
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// Custom event
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h.metricsAgg.RecordCustomEvent(event.Event)
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} else {
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// Pageview; process with full normalization pipeline
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var country, device, referrer string
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// Device classification
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if h.cfg.Site.Collect.Device {
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device = h.classifyDevice(event.Width)
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}
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// Referrer classification
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if h.cfg.Site.Collect.Referrer == "domain" {
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refDomain := normalize.ExtractReferrerDomain(event.Referrer, h.cfg.Site.Domain)
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if refDomain != "" {
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accepted := h.refRegistry.Add(refDomain)
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if accepted == "other" {
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h.metricsAgg.RecordReferrerOverflow()
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}
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referrer = accepted
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}
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}
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// FIXME: Country would be extracted from IP here. For now, we skip country extraction
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// because I have neither the time nor the patience to look into it. Return later.
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// Record pageview
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h.metricsAgg.RecordPageview(normalizedPath, country, device, referrer)
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}
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// Return success
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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// Adds CORS headers if enabled in config
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func (h *IngestionHandler) handleCORS(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !h.cfg.Security.CORS.Enabled {
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return
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}
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origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
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if origin == "" {
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return
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}
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// Check if origin is allowed
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allowed := false
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for _, allowedOrigin := range h.cfg.Security.CORS.AllowedOrigins {
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if allowedOrigin == "*" || allowedOrigin == origin {
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allowed = true
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break
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}
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}
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if allowed {
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if origin == "*" {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
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} else {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
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}
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "POST, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
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}
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}
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// Extracts the client IP from the requests. Only trusts proxy headers if source
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// IP is in trusted_proxies list
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func (h *IngestionHandler) extractIP(r *http.Request) string {
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// Get the direct connection IP
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remoteIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err != nil {
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// RemoteAddr might not have port (shouldn't happen, but handle it anyway)
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remoteIP = r.RemoteAddr
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}
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// Check if we should trust proxy headers
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trustProxy := false
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if len(h.cfg.Security.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
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for _, trustedCIDR := range h.cfg.Security.TrustedProxies {
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if h.ipInCIDR(remoteIP, trustedCIDR) {
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trustProxy = true
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break
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}
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}
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}
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// If not trusting proxy, return direct IP
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if !trustProxy {
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return remoteIP
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}
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// Check X-Forwarded-For header
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if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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// Take the rightmost IP that's not from a trusted proxy
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ips := strings.Split(xff, ",")
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for i := len(ips) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
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ip := strings.TrimSpace(ips[i])
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if !h.ipInCIDR(ip, "0.0.0.0/0") {
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continue
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}
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return ip
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}
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}
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// Check X-Real-IP header
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if xri := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); xri != "" {
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return xri
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}
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// Fall back to RemoteAddr
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return remoteIP
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}
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// Checks if an IP address is within a CIDR range
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func (h *IngestionHandler) ipInCIDR(ip, cidr string) bool {
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// Parse the IP address
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testIP := net.ParseIP(ip)
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if testIP == nil {
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return false
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}
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// Parse the CIDR
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_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
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if err != nil {
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// If it's not a CIDR, try as a single IP
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cidrIP := net.ParseIP(cidr)
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if cidrIP == nil {
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return false
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}
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return testIP.Equal(cidrIP)
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}
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return network.Contains(testIP)
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}
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// Classifies screen width into device categories using configured breakpoints
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// FIXME: we need a more robust mechanism for classifying devices. Breakpoints
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// are the only ones I can think of *right now* but I'm positive there are better
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// mechanisns. We'll get to this later.
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func (h *IngestionHandler) classifyDevice(width int) string {
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if width == 0 {
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return "unknown"
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}
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if width < h.cfg.Limits.DeviceBreakpoints.Mobile {
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return "mobile"
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}
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if width < h.cfg.Limits.DeviceBreakpoints.Tablet {
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return "tablet"
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}
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return "desktop"
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}
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